77 lines
4.1 KiB
Text
77 lines
4.1 KiB
Text
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usage: exclude_badExits.py [-h] [--https_cafile HTTPS_CAFILE]
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[--proxy_host PROXY_HOST] [--proxy_port PROXY_PORT]
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[--proxy_ctl PROXY_CTL] [--torrc TORRC]
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[--timeout TIMEOUT] [--good_nodes GOOD_NODES]
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[--bad_nodes BAD_NODES] [--bad_on BAD_ON]
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[--bad_contacts BAD_CONTACTS] [--saved_only]
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[--strict_nodes {0,1}] [--wait_boot WAIT_BOOT]
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[--points_timeout POINTS_TIMEOUT]
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[--log_level LOG_LEVEL]
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[--bad_sections BAD_SECTIONS]
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[--white_onions WHITE_ONIONS]
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[--torrc_output TORRC_OUTPUT] [--hs_dir HS_DIR]
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[--notice_log NOTICE_LOG]
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[--relays_output RELAYS_OUTPUT]
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[--wellknown_output WELLKNOWN_OUTPUT]
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[--good_contacts GOOD_CONTACTS]
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optional arguments:
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-h, --help show this help message and exit
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--https_cafile HTTPS_CAFILE
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Certificate Authority file (in PEM)
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--proxy_host PROXY_HOST, --proxy-host PROXY_HOST
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proxy host
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--proxy_port PROXY_PORT, --proxy-port PROXY_PORT
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proxy control port
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--proxy_ctl PROXY_CTL, --proxy-ctl PROXY_CTL
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control socket - or port
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--torrc TORRC torrc to check for suggestions
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--timeout TIMEOUT proxy download connect timeout
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--good_nodes GOOD_NODES
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Yaml file of good info that should not be excluded
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--bad_nodes BAD_NODES
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Yaml file of bad nodes that should also be excluded
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--bad_on BAD_ON comma sep list of conditions - Empty,NoEmail,NotGood
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--bad_contacts BAD_CONTACTS
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Yaml file of bad contacts that bad FPs are using
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--saved_only Just use the info in the last *.yaml files without
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querying the Tor controller
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--strict_nodes {0,1} Set StrictNodes: 1 is less anonymous but more secure,
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although some onion sites may be unreachable
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--wait_boot WAIT_BOOT
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Seconds to wait for Tor to booststrap
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--points_timeout POINTS_TIMEOUT
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Timeout for getting introduction points - must be long
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>120sec. 0 means disabled looking for IPs
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--log_level LOG_LEVEL
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10=debug 20=info 30=warn 40=error
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--bad_sections BAD_SECTIONS
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sections of the badnodes.yaml to use, in addition to
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BadExit, comma separated
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--white_onions WHITE_ONIONS
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comma sep. list of onions to whitelist their
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introduction points - BROKEN
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--torrc_output TORRC_OUTPUT
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Write the torrc configuration to a file
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--hs_dir HS_DIR Parse the files name hostname below this dir to find
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Hidden Services to whitelist
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--notice_log NOTICE_LOG
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Parse the notice log for relays and services
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--relays_output RELAYS_OUTPUT
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Write the download relays in json to a file
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--wellknown_output WELLKNOWN_OUTPUT
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Write the well-known files to a directory
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--good_contacts GOOD_CONTACTS
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Write the proof data of the included nodes to a YAML
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file
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This extends nusenu's basic idea of using the stem library to dynamically
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exclude nodes that are likely to be bad by putting them on the ExcludeNodes or
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ExcludeExitNodes setting of a running Tor. *
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https://github.com/nusenu/noContactInfo_Exit_Excluder *
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https://github.com/TheSmashy/TorExitRelayExclude The basic idea is to exclude
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Exit nodes that do not have ContactInfo: *
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https://github.com/nusenu/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification That
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can be extended to relays that do not have an email in the contact, or to
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relays that do not have ContactInfo that is verified to include them.
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