Fixes

exclude_badExits.py

@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ import re
 import socket
 import time
 import argparse
+import string
 from io import StringIO
 import ipaddr
 # list(ipaddress._find_address_range(ipaddress.IPv4Network('172.16.0.0/12'))
@@ -112,9 +113,6 @@ try:
     import coloredlogs
 except ImportError as e:
     coloredlogs = False
-    
-from trustor_poc import oDownloadUrl, idns_validate, TrustorError
-from support_onions import icheck_torrc, bAreWeConnected, lIntroductionPoints, zResolveDomain, vwait_for_controller, yKNOWN_NODNS
 
 global LOG
 import logging
@@ -122,6 +120,12 @@ import warnings
 warnings.filterwarnings('ignore')
 LOG = logging.getLogger()
 
+import requests
+from trustor_poc import oDownloadUrlUrllib3 as oDownloadUrl
+from trustor_poc import idns_validate, TrustorError
+from support_onions import icheck_torrc, bAreWeConnected, lIntroductionPoints, zResolveDomain, vwait_for_controller, yKNOWN_NODNS
+LOG.info("imported HTTPSAdapter")
+
 ETC_DIR = '/etc/tor/yaml'
 aTRUST_DB = {}
 aTRUST_DB_INDEX = {}
@@ -145,28 +149,37 @@ def oMakeController(sSock='', port=9051):
 
 oBAD_NODES = {}
 oBAD_ROOT = 'BadNodes'
+oBAD_NODES[oBAD_ROOT] = {}
+oBAD_NODES[oBAD_ROOT]['ExcludeNodes'] = {}
+
+lKNOWN_NODNS = []
+lMAYBE_NODNS = []
 def lYamlBadNodes(sFile,
                   section=sEXCLUDE_EXIT_KEY,
                   lWanted=['BadExit']):
     global oBAD_NODES
+    global lKNOWN_NODNS
+    global lMAYBE_NODNS
+    
     l = []
     if not yaml: return l
     if os.path.exists(sFile):
         with open(sFile, 'rt') as oFd:
             oBAD_NODES = yaml.safe_load(oFd)
 
-        # BROKEN
+    # BROKEN
 #    root = 'ExcludeNodes'
 #        for elt in o[oBAD_ROOT][root][section].keys():
 #            if lWanted and elt not in lWanted: continue
 #            # l += o[oBAD_ROOT][root][section][elt]
 
-    global lKNOWN_NODNS
+    l = oBAD_NODES[oBAD_ROOT]['ExcludeNodes']['BadExit']
+
     root = 'ExcludeDomains'
     if root not in oBAD_NODES[oBAD_ROOT] or not oBAD_NODES[oBAD_ROOT][root]:
-        oBAD_NODES[oBAD_ROOT][root] = yaml.safe_load(StringIO(yKNOWN_NODNS))
+        lMAYBE_NODNS = yaml.safe_load(StringIO(yKNOWN_NODNS))
     else:
-        lKNOWN_NODNS = oBAD_NODES[oBAD_ROOT][root]
+        lMAYBE_NODNS = oBAD_NODES[oBAD_ROOT][root]
     return l
 
 oGOOD_NODES = {}
@@ -185,6 +198,22 @@ def lYamlGoodNodes(sFile='/etc/tor/torrc-goodnodes.yaml'):
     # yq '.Nodes.IntroductionPoints|.[]' < /etc/tor/torrc-goodnodes.yaml
     return l
 
+def bdomain_is_bad(domain):
+    global lKNOWN_NODNS
+    if domain in lKNOWN_NODNS: return True
+    if domain in lMAYBE_NODNS:
+        ip = zResolveDomain(domain)
+        if ip == '':
+            LOG.debug(f"{fp} {domain} does not resolve")
+            lKNOWN_NODNS.append(domain)
+            lMAYBE_NODNS.remove(domain)
+            return True
+        
+    if '@' in domain:
+        LOG.warn(f"@ in domain {domain}")
+        return True
+    return False
+
 tBAD_URLS = set()
 lATS = ['abuse', 'email']
 lINTS = ['ciissversion', 'uplinkbw', 'signingkeylifetime', 'memory']
@@ -225,6 +254,7 @@ def aVerifyContact(a, fp, https_cafile, timeout=20, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050)
     if aTRUST_DB_INDEX and fp in aTRUST_DB_INDEX.keys():
         aCachedContact = aTRUST_DB_INDEX[fp]
         if aCachedContact['email'] == a['email']:
+            LOG.info(f"{fp} in aTRUST_DB_INDEX")
             return aCachedContact
        
     if 'url' not in keys:
@@ -237,18 +267,17 @@ def aVerifyContact(a, fp, https_cafile, timeout=20, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050)
         aFP_EMAIL[fp] = a['email']
         LOG.debug(f"{fp} 'uri' but not 'url' in {keys}")
         # drop through
-        
+
-    if a['url'].startswith('http:'):
+    c = a['url'].lstrip('https://').lstrip('http://').strip('/')
-        a['url'] = 'https:' +a['url'][5:]
+    a['url'] = 'https://' +c
-    elif not a['url'].startswith('https:'):
-        a['url'] = 'https:' +a['url']
         
     # domain should be a unique key for contacts
-    domain = a['url'][8:].strip('/')
+    domain = a['url'][8:]
-    if lKNOWN_NODNS and domain in lKNOWN_NODNS:
+    if bdomain_is_bad(domain):
-        LOG.warn(f"{domain} in lKNOWN_NODNS")
+        LOG.warn(f"{domain} is bad from {a['url']}")
-        return {}
+        LOG.info(f"{domain} is bad from {a}")
-    ip = zResolveDomain(domain, lKNOWN_NODNS)
+        return a
+    ip = zResolveDomain(domain)
     if ip == '':
         aFP_EMAIL[fp] = a['email']
         LOG.debug(f"{fp} {domain} does not resolve")
@@ -268,9 +297,10 @@ def aVerifyContact(a, fp, https_cafile, timeout=20, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050)
         return a
     
     LOG.debug(f"{len(keys)} contact fields for {fp}")
+    url="https://"+domain+"/.well-known/tor-relay/rsa-fingerprint.txt"
     try:
         LOG.debug(f"Downloading from {domain} for {fp}")
-        o = oDownloadUrl(domain, https_cafile,
+        o = oDownloadUrl(url, https_cafile,
                          timeout=timeout, host=host, port=port)
         # requests response: text "reason", "status_code"
     except AttributeError as e:
@@ -288,20 +318,52 @@ def aVerifyContact(a, fp, https_cafile, timeout=20, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050)
     except (BaseException ) as e:
         LOG.error(f"Exception {type(e)} downloading from {domain} {e}")
     else:
-        if o.status_code >= 300:
+        if hasattr(o, 'status'):
+            status_code = o.status
+        else:
+            status_code = o.status_code
+        if status_code >= 300:
             aFP_EMAIL[fp] = a['email']
-            LOG.warn(f"Error from {domain} {o.status_code} {o.reason}")
+            LOG.warn(f"Error from {domain} {status_code} {o.reason}")
             # any reason retry?
             tBAD_URLS.add(a['url'])
             return a
             
-        l = o.text.upper().strip().split('\n')
+        if hasattr(o, 'text'):
-        a['modified'] = time.time()
+            data = o.text
+        else:
+            data = str(o.data, 'UTF-8')
+        l = data.upper().strip().split('\n')
+        LOG.debug(f"Downloaded from {domain} {len(l)} lines {len(data)} bytes")
+
+        a['modified'] = int(time.time())
         if not l:
             LOG.warn(f"Downloading from {domain} empty for {fp}")
         else:
             a['fps'] = [elt for elt in l if elt and len(elt) == 40
                         and not elt.startswith('#')]
+            LOG.info(f"Downloaded from {domain} {len(a['fps'])} FPs")
+    return a
+
+def aParseContactYaml(contact, fp):
+    """
+    See the Tor ContactInfo Information Sharing Specification v2 
+    https://nusenu.github.io/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification/
+    """
+    lelts = contact.split()
+    a = {}
+    if len(lelts) % 1 != 0:
+        LOG.warn(f"bad contact for {fp} odd number of components")
+        LOG.debug(f"{fp} {a}")
+        return a
+    key = ''
+    for elt in lets:
+        if key == '':
+            key = elt
+            continue
+        a[key] = elt
+        key = ''
+    LOG.debug(f"{fp} {len(a.keys())} fields")
     return a
 
 def aParseContact(contact, fp):
@@ -419,7 +481,7 @@ def oMainArgparser(_=None):
 
     parser.add_argument('--good_nodes', type=str,
                         default=os.path.join(ETC_DIR, 'torrc-goodnodes.yaml'),
-                        help="Yaml file of good nodes that should not be excluded")
+                        help="Yaml file of good info that should not be excluded")
     parser.add_argument('--bad_nodes', type=str,
                         default=os.path.join(ETC_DIR, 'torrc-badnodes.yaml'),
                         help="Yaml file of bad nodes that should also be excluded")
@@ -434,7 +496,9 @@ def oMainArgparser(_=None):
                         help="Set StrictNodes: 1 is less anonymous but more secure, although some sites may be unreachable")
     parser.add_argument('--wait_boot', type=int, default=120,
                         help="Seconds to wait for Tor to booststrap")
-    parser.add_argument('--log_level', type=int, default=20,
+    parser.add_argument('--points_timeout', type=int, default=0,
+                        help="Timeout for getting introduction points - must be long >120sec. 0 means disabled looking for IPs")
+    parser.add_argument('--log_level', type=int, default=10,
                         help="10=debug 20=info 30=warn 40=error")
     parser.add_argument('--bad_sections', type=str,
                         default='MyBadExit',
@@ -501,7 +565,7 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
             # but...
             for k,v in aTRUST_DB.items():
                 if 'modified' not in v.keys():
-                    v['modified'] = time.time()
+                    v['modified'] = int(time.time())
                 aTRUST_DB_INDEX[k] = v
                 if 'fps' in aTRUST_DB[k].keys():
                     for fp in aTRUST_DB[k]['fps']:
@@ -546,9 +610,11 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
     w = set(oGOOD_NODES[oGOOD_ROOT]['Services'])
     if oArgs.white_services:
         w.update(oArgs.white_services.split(','))
-        t.update(lIntroductionPoints(controller, w))
+    if oArgs.points_timeout > 0:
+        LOG.info(f"{len(w)} services will be checked from IntroductionPoints")
+        t.update(lIntroductionPoints(controller, w, itimeout=oArgs.points_timeout))
     if len(t) > 0:
-        LOG.info(f"IntroductionPoints {len(t)} nodes")    
+        LOG.info(f"IntroductionPoints {len(t)} relays from {len(w)} services")
         twhitelist_set.update(t)
 
     texclude_set = set()
@@ -556,17 +622,15 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
         if False and oArgs.bad_sections:
             # BROKEN
             sections = oArgs.bad_sections.split(',')
-            lexclude_list = set(lYamlBadNodes(oArgs.bad_nodes,
+            texclude_set = set(lYamlBadNodes(oArgs.bad_nodes,
                                              lWanted=sections,
                                              section=sEXCLUDE_EXIT_KEY))
-        else:
+            LOG.info(f"Preloaded {len(texclude_set)} bad fps")    
-            texclude_set = set(lYamlBadNodes(oArgs.bad_nodes))
-
-    LOG.info(f"lYamlBadNodes {len(texclude_set)}")
 
     ttrust_db_index = aTRUST_DB_INDEX.keys()
-    iDnsContact = 0
+    tdns_contacts = set()
     iFakeContact = 0
+    iTotalContacts = 0
     aBadContacts = {}
     
     lConds = oArgs.contact.split(',')
@@ -580,12 +644,12 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
             continue
         relay.fingerprint = relay.fingerprint.upper()
         
-        sofar = f"G:{len(aTRUST_DB.keys())} U:{iDnsContact} F:{iFakeContact} BF:{len(texclude_set)} GF:{len(ttrust_db_index)} #{iR}"
+        sofar = f"G:{len(aTRUST_DB.keys())} U:{len(tdns_contacts)} F:{iFakeContact} BF:{len(texclude_set)} GF:{len(ttrust_db_index)} TC:{iTotalContacts} #{iR}"
         if not relay.exit_policy.is_exiting_allowed():
             if sEXCLUDE_EXIT_KEY == 'ExcludeNodes':
-                LOG.debug(f"{relay.fingerprint} not an exit {sofar}")
+                pass # LOG.debug(f"{relay.fingerprint} not an exit {sofar}")
             else:
-                LOG.warn(f"{relay.fingerprint} not an exit {sofar}")
+                pass # LOG.warn(f"{relay.fingerprint} not an exit {sofar}")
             # continue
             
         # great contact had good fps and we are in them
@@ -598,43 +662,51 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
             relay.contact = str(relay.contact, 'UTF-8')
             
         if ('Empty' in lConds and not relay.contact) or \
-           ('NoEmail' in lConds and relay.contact and not '@' in relay.contact):
+           ('NoEmail' in lConds and relay.contact and not 'email:' in relay.contact):
             texclude_set.add(relay.fingerprint)
             continue
         
         if not relay.contact or not 'ciissversion:' in relay.contact:
             # should be unreached 'Empty' should always be in lConds
             continue
+        iTotalContacts += 1
+        
+        if relay.contact and not 'url:' in relay.contact:
+            LOG.info(f"{relay.fingerprint} skipping bad contact - no url: {sofar}")
+            LOG.debug(f"{relay.fingerprint} {relay.contact} {sofar}")
+            texclude_set.add(relay.fingerprint)
+            continue
         
         c = relay.contact.lower()
         # first rough cut
         i = c.find('url:')
-        if i >=0: c = c[i+4:]
+        if i >=0:
+            c = c[i+4:]           
         i = c.find(' ')
         if i >=0: c = c[:i]
-        c = c.replace('https://', '').replace('http://', '').strip('/')
+        c = c.lstrip('https://').lstrip('http://').strip('/')
         i = c.find('/')
         if i >=0: c = c[:i]
         domain = c
-        LOG.info(f"{relay.fingerprint} domain={domain}")
+        if domain and bdomain_is_bad(domain):
-        if domain and domain in lKNOWN_NODNS:
+            LOG.info(f"{relay.fingerprint} skipping bad {domain} {sofar}")
-            LOG.info(f"{relay.fingerprint} skipping in lKNOWN_NODNS {domain} {sofar}")
+            LOG.debug(f"{relay.fingerprint} {relay.contact} {sofar}")
             texclude_set.add(relay.fingerprint)
             continue
 
         if domain:
-            ip = zResolveDomain(domain, lKNOWN_NODNS)
+            ip = zResolveDomain(domain)
             if not ip:
                 LOG.warn(f"{relay.fingerprint} {domain} did not resolve {sofar}")
                 texclude_set.add(relay.fingerprint)
+                lKNOWN_NODNS.append(domain)
                 iFakeContact += 1
                 continue
         
         if 'dns-rsa' in relay.contact.lower():            
-            target = f"{relay.fingerprint}.{domain}"
+            target = f"{relay.fingerprint}.{domain}"            
-            
             LOG.info(f"skipping 'dns-rsa' {target} {sofar}")
-            iDnsContact += 1
+            tdns_contacts.add(target)
         
         elif 'proof:uri-rsa' in relay.contact.lower():
             a = aParseContact(relay.contact, relay.fingerprint)
@@ -646,6 +718,7 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
                 if a['url'] in tBAD_URLS:
                     # The fp is using a contact with a URL we know is bad
                     LOG.info(f"{relay.fingerprint} skipping in tBAD_URLS {a['url']}  {sofar}")
+                    LOG.debug(f"{relay.fingerprint} {a} {sofar}")
                     iFakeContact += 1
                     texclude_set.add(relay.fingerprint)
                     continue
@@ -653,6 +726,7 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
                 if domain in lKNOWN_NODNS:
                     # The fp is using a contact with a URL we know is bogus
                     LOG.info(f"{relay.fingerprint} skipping in lKNOWN_NODNS {a['url']} {sofar}")
+                    LOG.debug(f"{relay.fingerprint} {a} {sofar}")
                     iFakeContact += 1
                     texclude_set.add(relay.fingerprint)
                     continue
@@ -667,6 +741,7 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
             
             if not b or not 'fps' in b or not b['fps'] or not b['url']:
                 LOG.warn(f"{relay.fingerprint} did NOT VERIFY {sofar}")
+                LOG.debug(f"{relay.fingerprint} {b} {sofar}")
                 # If it's giving contact info that doesnt check out
                 # it could be a bad exit with fake contact info
                 texclude_set.add(relay.fingerprint)
@@ -692,17 +767,19 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
                     yaml.dump(aTRUST_DB, indent=2, stream=oFYaml)
                     oFYaml.close()
         
+    LOG.info(f"Filtered {len(twhitelist_set)} whitelisted relays")
     texclude_set = texclude_set.difference(twhitelist_set)
+    LOG.info(f"{len(list(aTRUST_DB.keys()))} good contacts out of {iTotalContacts}")
 
     if oArgs.proof_output and aTRUST_DB:
         with open(proof_output_tmp, 'wt') as oFYaml:
             yaml.dump(aTRUST_DB, indent=2, stream=oFYaml)
-            LOG.info(f"Wrote {len(list(aTRUST_DB.keys()))} good contact details to {oArgs.proof_output}")
             oFYaml.close()
         if os.path.exists(oArgs.proof_output):
             bak = oArgs.proof_output +'.bak'
             os.rename(oArgs.proof_output, bak)
         os.rename(proof_output_tmp, oArgs.proof_output)
+        LOG.info(f"Wrote {len(list(aTRUST_DB.keys()))} good contact details to {oArgs.proof_output}")
 
     if oArgs.torrc_output and texclude_set:
         with open(oArgs.torrc_output, 'wt') as oFTorrc:
@@ -725,7 +802,6 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
     oGOOD_NODES['GoodNodes']['Relays']['ExitNodes'] = list(aTRUST_DB_INDEX.keys())
     # GuardNodes are readonl
     vwrite_goodnodes(oArgs, oGOOD_NODES, str(len(ttrust_db_index)))
-        
     retval = 0
     try:
         logging.getLogger('stem').setLevel(30)
@@ -762,6 +838,7 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
             LOG.errro(f"Failed setting {sINCLUDE_EXIT_KEY} good exit nodes in Tor")
             retval += 1
 
+        LOG.info("dns-rsa domains:\n{'\n'.join(tdns_contacts)}")
         return retval
 
     except InvalidRequest as e:

https_adapter.py

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import urllib3
 from urllib3.util import parse_url
 from urllib3.util.retry import Retry
 from urllib3.util import Timeout as TimeoutSauce
-from urllib3.util.ssl_match_hostname import match_hostname as match_hostname
 
 DEFAULT_POOLBLOCK = False
 DEFAULT_POOLSIZE = 10
@@ -264,78 +263,3 @@ class HTTPSAdapter(HTTPAdapter):
 
         return self.build_response(request, resp)
 
-def ballow_subdomain_matching(hostname, dnsnames):
-    for elt in dnsnames:
-        if len(split(hostname, '.')) > len(split(elt, '.')) and \
-          hostname.endswith(elt):
-            # parent
-            return True
-    return False
-
-def my_match_hostname(cert, hostname):
-    """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
-    SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*.  RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
-    rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
-
-    CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
-    returns nothing.
-    """
-    if not cert:
-        raise ValueError(
-            "empty or no certificate, match_hostname needs a "
-            "SSL socket or SSL context with either "
-            "CERT_OPTIONAL or CERT_REQUIRED"
-        )
-    try:
-        # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
-        host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(_to_unicode(hostname))
-    except (UnicodeError, ValueError):
-        # ValueError: Not an IP address (common case)
-        # UnicodeError: Divergence from upstream: Have to deal with ipaddress not taking
-        # byte strings.  addresses should be all ascii, so we consider it not
-        # an ipaddress in this case
-        host_ip = None
-    except AttributeError:
-        # Divergence from upstream: Make ipaddress library optional
-        if ipaddress is None:
-            host_ip = None
-        else:  # Defensive
-            raise
-    dnsnames = []
-    san = cert.get("subjectAltName", ())
-    for key, value in san:
-        if key == "DNS":
-            if host_ip is None and _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
-                return
-            dnsnames.append(value)
-        elif key == "IP Address":
-            if host_ip is not None and _ipaddress_match(value, host_ip):
-                return
-            dnsnames.append(value)
-    if not dnsnames:
-        # The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
-        # in subjectAltName
-        for sub in cert.get("subject", ()):
-            for key, value in sub:
-                # XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
-                # must be used.
-                if key == "commonName":
-                    if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
-                        return
-                    dnsnames.append(value)
-    if len(dnsnames) > 1:
-        # soften this to allow subdomain matching
-        if ballow_subdomain_matching(hostname, dnsnames):
-            return
-        raise CertificateError(
-            "hostname %r "
-            "doesn't match any of %s" % (hostname, ", ".join(map(repr, dnsnames)))
-        )
-    elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
-        raise CertificateError("hostname %r doesn't match %r" % (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
-    else:
-        raise CertificateError(
-            "no appropriate commonName or subjectAltName fields were found"
-        )
-
-urllib3.util.ssl_match_hostname.match_hostnaem = my_match_hostname

support_onions.py

@@ -157,43 +157,48 @@ def lIntroductionPoints(controller=None, lOnions=[], itimeout=120, log_level=10)
     
     from stem.descriptor.hidden_service import HiddenServiceDescriptorV3
     from stem.client.datatype import LinkByFingerprint
-
+    from stem import Timeout
+    from queue import Empty
+    
     if type(lOnions) not in [set, tuple, list]:
         lOnions = list(lOnions)
     if controller is None:
         controller = oGetStemController(log_level=log_level)
     l = []
-    try:
+    for elt in lOnions:
-      for elt in lOnions:
         LOG.info(f"controller.get_hidden_service_descriptor {elt}")
-        desc = controller.get_hidden_service_descriptor(elt,
+        try:
-                                                        await_result=True,
+            desc = controller.get_hidden_service_descriptor(elt,
-                                                        timeout=itimeout)
+                                                            await_result=True,
-#        LOG.log(40, f"{dir(desc)} get_hidden_service_descriptor")
+                                                            timeout=itimeout)
-        # timeouts 20 sec
+    #        LOG.log(40, f"{dir(desc)} get_hidden_service_descriptor")
-        # mistakenly a HSv2 descriptor
+            # timeouts 20 sec
-        hs_address = HiddenServiceDescriptorV3.from_str(str(desc))  # reparse as HSv3
+            # mistakenly a HSv2 descriptor
-        oInnerLayer = hs_address.decrypt(elt)
+            hs_address = HiddenServiceDescriptorV3.from_str(str(desc))  # reparse as HSv3
-#        LOG.log(40, f"{dir(oInnerLayer)}")
+            oInnerLayer = hs_address.decrypt(elt)
+    #        LOG.log(40, f"{dir(oInnerLayer)}")
 
-        # IntroductionPointV3
+            # IntroductionPointV3
-        n = oInnerLayer.introduction_points
+            n = oInnerLayer.introduction_points
-        if not n:
+            if not n:
-            LOG.warn(f"NO introduction points for {elt}")
+                LOG.warn(f"NO introduction points for {elt}")
+                continue
+            LOG.info(f"{elt} {len(n)} introduction points")
+            lp = []
+            for introduction_point in n:
+                for linkspecifier in introduction_point.link_specifiers:
+                    if isinstance(linkspecifier, LinkByFingerprint):
+    #                    LOG.log(40, f"Getting fingerprint for {linkspecifier}")
+                        if hasattr(linkspecifier, 'fingerprint'):
+                            assert len(linkspecifier.value) == 20
+                            lp += [bin_to_hex(linkspecifier.value)]
+            LOG.info(f"{len(lp)} introduction points for {elt}")
+            l += lp
+        except (Empty, Timeout, ) as e:
+            LOG.warn(f"Timed out getting introduction points for {elt}")
             continue
-        LOG.info(f"{elt} {len(n)} introduction points")
+        except Exception as e:
-        lp = []
+          LOG.exception(e)
-        for introduction_point in n:
-            for linkspecifier in introduction_point.link_specifiers:
-                if isinstance(linkspecifier, LinkByFingerprint):
-#                    LOG.log(40, f"Getting fingerprint for {linkspecifier}")
-                    if hasattr(linkspecifier, 'fingerprint'):
-                        assert len(linkspecifier.value) == 20
-                        lp += [bin_to_hex(linkspecifier.value)]
-        LOG.info(f"{len(lp)} introduction points for {elt}")
-        l += lp
-    except Exception as e:
-      LOG.exception(e)
     return l
 
 def zResolveDomain(domain):

trustor_poc.py

@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ import datetime
 import requests
 from stem.control import Controller
 from stem.util.tor_tools import *
-from urllib.parse import urlparse
+# from urllib.parse import urlparse
-from urllib3.util.retry import Retry
+from urllib3.util import parse_url as urlparse
 
 try:
     # unbound is not on pypi
@@ -207,8 +207,7 @@ def find_validation_candidates(controller, trusted_domains=[],validation_cache=[
                             result[domain] = {prooftype : [fingerprint]}
     return result
 
-def oDownloadUrl(domain, sCAfile, timeout=30, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050):
+def oDownloadUrlRequests(uri, sCAfile, timeout=30, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050):
-    uri="https://"+domain+"/.well-known/tor-relay/rsa-fingerprint.txt"
     # socks proxy used for outbound web requests (for validation of proofs)
     proxy = {'https': 'socks5h://' +host +':' +str(port)}
     # we use this UA string when connecting to webservers to fetch rsa-fingerprint.txt proof files
@@ -229,24 +228,12 @@ def oDownloadUrl(domain, sCAfile, timeout=30, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050):
         raise TrustorError(f"HTTP Content-Type != text/plain")
     if not os.path.exists(sCAfile):
         raise TrustorError(f"File not found CAfile {sCAfile}")
-    try:
-        from https_adapter import HTTPSAdapter
-    except Exception as e:
-        LOG.warn(f"Could not import HTTPSAdapter {e}")
-        HTTPSAdapter = None
-        raise SystemExit(f"{e}")
-    else:
-        LOG.info(f"Loaded HTTPSAdapter")
     
     try:
         with requests.sessions.Session() as session:
-            if HTTPSAdapter:
-                retries = Retry(connect=3, read=2, redirect=0)
-                # FixMe: upgrade to TLS1.3
-                session.mount("https://", HTTPSAdapter(pool_maxsize=1,
-                                                       max_retries=retries,))
             oReqResp = session.request(method="get", url=uri,
-                                       proxies=proxy, timeout=timeout,
+                                       proxies=proxy,
+                                       timeout=timeout,
                                        headers=headers,
                                        allow_redirects=False,
                                        verify=True
@@ -265,8 +252,182 @@ def oDownloadUrl(domain, sCAfile, timeout=30, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050):
         raise TrustorError(f'Redirect detected %s vs %s (final)' % (uri, oReqResp.url))
     return oReqResp
 
+logging.getLogger("urllib3").setLevel(logging.INFO)
+#import urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl
+#urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl.inject_into_urllib3()
+
+import urllib3.util
+import ipaddress
+def ballow_subdomain_matching(hostname, dnsnames):
+    for elt in dnsnames:
+        if len(hostname.split('.')) > len(elt.split('.')) and \
+          hostname.endswith(elt):
+            # parent
+            return True
+    return False
+
+from urllib3.util.ssl_match_hostname import (CertificateError,
+                                             match_hostname,
+                                             _dnsname_match,
+                                             _ipaddress_match,
+                                             )
+def my_match_hostname(cert, hostname):
+    """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
+    SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*.  RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
+    rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
+
+    CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
+    returns nothing.
+    """
+    if not cert:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "empty or no certificate, match_hostname needs a "
+            "SSL socket or SSL context with either "
+            "CERT_OPTIONAL or CERT_REQUIRED"
+        )
+    try:
+        # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
+        host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
+    except (UnicodeError, ValueError):
+        # ValueError: Not an IP address (common case)
+        # UnicodeError: Divergence from upstream: Have to deal with ipaddress not taking
+        # byte strings.  addresses should be all ascii, so we consider it not
+        # an ipaddress in this case
+        host_ip = None
+    except AttributeError:
+        # Divergence from upstream: Make ipaddress library optional
+        if ipaddress is None:
+            host_ip = None
+        else:  # Defensive
+            raise
+    dnsnames = []
+    san = cert.get("subjectAltName", ())
+    for key, value in san:
+        if key == "DNS":
+            if host_ip is None and _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
+                return
+            dnsnames.append(value)
+        elif key == "IP Address":
+            if host_ip is not None and _ipaddress_match(value, host_ip):
+                return
+            dnsnames.append(value)
+    if not dnsnames:
+        # The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
+        # in subjectAltName
+        for sub in cert.get("subject", ()):
+            for key, value in sub:
+                # XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
+                # must be used.
+                if key == "commonName":
+                    if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
+                        return
+                    dnsnames.append(value)
+    if len(dnsnames) > 1:
+        # soften this to allow subdomain matching
+        if ballow_subdomain_matching(hostname, dnsnames):
+            LOG.warn(f"Allowing {hostname} in {dnsnames}")
+            return
+        raise CertificateError(
+            "hostname %r "
+            "doesn't match any of %s" % (hostname, ", ".join(map(repr, dnsnames)))
+        )
+    elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
+        raise CertificateError("hostname %r doesn't match %r" % (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
+    else:
+        raise CertificateError(
+            "no appropriate commonName or subjectAltName fields were found"
+        )    
+match_hostname = my_match_hostname
+from urllib3.util.ssl_ import (
+    is_ipaddress,
+)
+def _my_match_hostname(cert, asserted_hostname):
+    # Our upstream implementation of ssl.match_hostname()
+    # only applies this normalization to IP addresses so it doesn't
+    # match DNS SANs so we do the same thing!
+    stripped_hostname = asserted_hostname.strip("u[]")
+    if is_ipaddress(stripped_hostname):
+        asserted_hostname = stripped_hostname
+    try:
+        my_match_hostname(cert, asserted_hostname)
+    except CertificateError as e:
+        log.warning(
+            "Certificate did not match hostname: %s. Certificate: %s",
+            asserted_hostname,
+            cert,
+        )
+        # Add cert to exception and reraise so client code can inspect
+        # the cert when catching the exception, if they want to
+        e._peer_cert = cert
+        raise
+from urllib3.connection import _match_hostname, HTTPSConnection
+urllib3.connection._match_hostname = _my_match_hostname
+
+from urllib3.contrib.socks import SOCKSProxyManager
+from urllib3 import Retry
+def oDownloadUrlUrllib3(uri, sCAfile, timeout=30, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050):
+    """Theres no need to use requests here and it
+    adds too many layers on the SSL to be able to get at things
+    """
+    domain = urlparse(uri).netloc
+    # socks proxy used for outbound web requests (for validation of proofs)
+    proxy = SOCKSProxyManager(f'socks5h://{host}:{port}/',
+                              num_pools=1,
+                              timeout=timeout,
+                              cert_reqs='CERT_REQUIRED',
+                              assert_hostname=domain,
+                              ca_certs=sCAfile)
+
+    # we use this UA string when connecting to webservers to fetch rsa-fingerprint.txt proof files
+    # https://nusenu.github.io/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification/#uri-rsa
+    headers = {'User-Agent':'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0'}
+
+    LOG.debug("fetching %s...." % uri)
+    try:
+        # grr. fix urllib3
+        # Errors will be wrapped in :class:`~urllib3.exceptions.MaxRetryError` unless
+        # retries are disabled, in which case the causing exception will be raised.
+        head = proxy.request('HEAD', uri,
+                             headers=headers,
+                             redirect=False,
+                             retries=False)
+    except Exception as e:
+        LOG.error(f"HTTP HEAD request failed for {uri} {e}")
+        raise 
+    
+    if head.status >= 300:
+        raise TrustorError(f"HTTP Errorcode {head.status}")
+    if not head.headers['Content-Type'].startswith('text/plain'):
+        raise TrustorError(f"HTTP Content-Type != text/plain")
+    if not os.path.exists(sCAfile):
+        raise TrustorError(f"File not found CAfile {sCAfile}")
+    
+    try:
+        oReqResp = proxy.request("GET", uri,
+                                 headers=headers,
+                                 redirect=False,
+                                 )
+    except Exception as e:
+        LOG.warn(f"HTTP GET request failed for {uri} {e}")
+        raise
+    if oReqResp.status != 200:
+        raise TrustorError(f"HTTP Errorcode {head.status}")
+    if not oReqResp.headers['Content-Type'].startswith('text/plain'):
+        raise TrustorError(f"HTTP Content-Type != text/plain")
+
+    #check for redirects (not allowed as per spec)
+    if oReqResp.geturl() != uri:
+        LOG.error(f'Redirect detected %s vs %s (final)' % (uri, oReqResp.geturl()))
+        raise TrustorError(f'Redirect detected %s vs %s (final)' % (uri, oReqResp.geturl()))
+    oReqResp.decode_content = True
+    
+    return oReqResp
+import urllib3.connectionpool
+urllib3.connectionpool.VerifiedHTTPSConnection = HTTPSConnection
+
 def lDownloadUrlFps(domain, sCAfile, timeout=30, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050):
-    o = oDownloadUrl(domain, sCAfile, timeout=timeout, host=host, port=port)
+    uri="https://"+domain+"/.well-known/tor-relay/rsa-fingerprint.txt"
+    o = oDownloadUrlRequests(uri, sCAfile, timeout=timeout, host=host, port=port)
     well_known_content = o.text.upper().strip().split('\n')
     well_known_content = [i for i in well_known_content if i and len(i) == 40]
     return well_known_content
@@ -365,6 +526,8 @@ def configure_tor(controller, trusted_fingerprints, exitonly=True):
         LOG.exception('Failed to set ExitNodes tor config to trusted relays')
         sys.exit(20)
 
+
+
 if __name__ == '__main__':
     trust_config = 'trust_config'
     assert os.path.exists(trust_config)