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5 changed files with 591 additions and 347 deletions
145
README.md
145
README.md
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@ -19,18 +19,53 @@ or use these lists for other applications like selektor.
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So we make two files that are structured in YAML:
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```
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/etc/tor/yaml/torrc-goodnodes.yaml
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---
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GoodNodes:
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EntryNodes: []
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Relays:
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IntroductionPoints:
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- NODEFINGERPRINT
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...
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# ExitNodes will be overwritten by this program
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ExitNodes: []
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IntroductionPoints: []
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# use the Onions section to list onion services you want the
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# Introduction Points whitelisted - these points may change daily
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# Look in tor's notice.log for 'Every introduction point for service'
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Onions: []
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# use the Services list to list elays you want the whitelisted
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# Look in tor's notice.log for 'Wanted to contact directory mirror'
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Services: []
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By default all sections of the goodnodes.yaml are used as a whitelist.
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Use the GoodNodes/Onions list to list onion services you want the
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Introduction Points whitelisted - these points may change daily
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Look in tor's notice.log for warnings of 'Every introduction point for service'
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```--hs_dir``` ```default='/var/lib/tor'``` will make the program
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parse the files named ```hostname``` below this dir to find
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Hidden Services to whitelist.
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The Introduction Points can change during the day, so you may want to
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rerun this program to freshen the list of Introduction Points. A full run
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that processes all the relays from stem can take 30 minutes, or run with:
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```--saved_only``` will run the program with just cached information
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on the relats, but will update the Introduction Points from the Services.
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/etc/tor/yaml/torrc-badnodes.yaml
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BadNodes:
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ExcludeExitNodes:
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BadExit:
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# $0000000000000000000000000000000000000007
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# list the internet domains you know are bad so you don't
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# waste time trying to download contacts from them.
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ExcludeDomains: []
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ExcludeNodes:
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# BadExit will be overwritten by this program
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BadExit: []
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# list MyBadExit in --bad_sections if you want it used, to exclude nodes
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# or any others as a list separated by comma(,)
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MyBadExit: []
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```
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That part requires [PyYAML](https://pyyaml.org/wiki/PyYAML)
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https://github.com/yaml/pyyaml/ or ```ruamel```: do
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@ -39,7 +74,7 @@ the advantage of the former is that it preserves comments.
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(You may have to run this as the Tor user to get RW access to
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/run/tor/control, in which case the directory for the YAML files must
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be group Tor writeable, and its parents group Tor RX.)
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be group Tor writeable, and its parent's directories group Tor RX.)
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Because you don't want to exclude the introduction points to any onion
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you want to connect to, ```--white_onions``` should whitelist the
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@ -47,6 +82,13 @@ introduction points to a comma sep list of onions; we fixed stem to do this:
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* https://github.com/torproject/stem/issues/96
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* https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/25417
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Use the GoodNodes/Onions list in goodnodes.yaml to list onion services
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you want the Introduction Points whitelisted - these points may change daily.
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Look in tor's notice.log for 'Every introduction point for service'
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```notice_log``` will parse the notice log for warnings about relays and
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services that will then be whitelisted.
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```--torrc_output``` will write the torrc ExcludeNodes configuration to a file.
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```--good_contacts``` will write the contact info as a ciiss dictionary
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@ -71,7 +113,7 @@ list of fingerprints to ```ExitNodes```, a whitelist of relays to use as exits.
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3. clean relays that don't have "good' contactinfo. (implies 1)
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```=Empty,NoEmail,NotGood```
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The default is ```=Empty,NotGood``` ; ```NoEmail``` is inherently imperfect
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The default is ```Empty,NoEmail,NotGood``` ; ```NoEmail``` is inherently imperfect
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in that many of the contact-as-an-email are obfuscated, but we try anyway.
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To be "good" the ContactInfo must:
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@ -80,81 +122,20 @@ To be "good" the ContactInfo must:
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3. must support getting the file with a valid SSL cert from a recognized authority
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4. (not in the spec but added by Python) must use a TLS SSL > v1
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5. must have a fingerprint list in the file
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6. must have the FP that got us the contactinfo in the fingerprint list in the file,
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6. must have the FP that got us the contactinfo in the fingerprint list in the file.
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```--wait_boot``` is the number of seconds to wait for Tor to booststrap
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```--wellknown_output``` will make the program write the well-known files
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(```/.well-known/tor-relay/rsa-fingerprint.txt```) to a directory.
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```--torrc_output``` will write a file of the commands that it sends to
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the Tor controller, so you can include it in a ```/etc/toc/torrc```.
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```--relays_output write the download relays in json to a file. The relays
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are downloaded from https://onionoo.torproject.org/details
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For usage, do ```python3 exclude_badExits.py --help`
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See [exclude_badExits.txt](./exclude_badExits.txt)
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## Usage
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```
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usage: exclude_badExits.py [-h] [--https_cafile HTTPS_CAFILE]
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[--proxy_host PROXY_HOST] [--proxy_port PROXY_PORT]
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[--proxy_ctl PROXY_CTL] [--torrc TORRC]
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[--timeout TIMEOUT] [--good_nodes GOOD_NODES]
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[--bad_nodes BAD_NODES] [--bad_on BAD_ON]
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[--bad_contacts BAD_CONTACTS]
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[--strict_nodes {0,1}] [--wait_boot WAIT_BOOT]
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[--points_timeout POINTS_TIMEOUT]
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[--log_level LOG_LEVEL]
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[--bad_sections BAD_SECTIONS]
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[--white_onions WHITE_ONIONS]
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[--torrc_output TORRC_OUTPUT]
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[--relays_output RELAYS_OUTPUT]
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[--good_contacts GOOD_CONTACTS]
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optional arguments:
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-h, --help show this help message and exit
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--https_cafile HTTPS_CAFILE
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Certificate Authority file (in PEM)
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--proxy_host PROXY_HOST, --proxy-host PROXY_HOST
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proxy host
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--proxy_port PROXY_PORT, --proxy-port PROXY_PORT
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proxy control port
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--proxy_ctl PROXY_CTL, --proxy-ctl PROXY_CTL
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control socket - or port
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--torrc TORRC torrc to check for suggestions
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--timeout TIMEOUT proxy download connect timeout
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--good_nodes GOOD_NODES
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Yaml file of good info that should not be excluded
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--bad_nodes BAD_NODES
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Yaml file of bad nodes that should also be excluded
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--bad_on BAD_ON comma sep list of conditions - Empty,NoEmail,NotGood
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--bad_contacts BAD_CONTACTS
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Yaml file of bad contacts that bad FPs are using
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--strict_nodes {0,1} Set StrictNodes: 1 is less anonymous but more secure,
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although some sites may be unreachable
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--wait_boot WAIT_BOOT
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Seconds to wait for Tor to booststrap
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--points_timeout POINTS_TIMEOUT
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Timeout for getting introduction points - must be long
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>120sec. 0 means disabled looking for IPs
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--log_level LOG_LEVEL
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10=debug 20=info 30=warn 40=error
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--bad_sections BAD_SECTIONS
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sections of the badnodes.yaml to use, comma separated,
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'' BROKEN
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--white_onions WHITE_ONIONS
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comma sep. list of onions to whitelist their
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introduction points - BROKEN
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--torrc_output TORRC_OUTPUT
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Write the torrc configuration to a file
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--relays_output RELAYS_OUTPUT
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Write the download relays in json to a file
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--good_contacts GOOD_CONTACTS
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Write the proof data of the included nodes to a YAML
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file
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This extends nusenu's basic idea of using the stem library to dynamically
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exclude nodes that are likely to be bad by putting them on the ExcludeNodes or
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ExcludeExitNodes setting of a running Tor. *
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https://github.com/nusenu/noContactInfo_Exit_Excluder *
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https://github.com/TheSmashy/TorExitRelayExclude The basic idea is to exclude
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Exit nodes that do not have ContactInfo: *
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https://github.com/nusenu/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification That
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can be extended to relays that do not have an email in the contact, or to
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relays that do not have ContactInfo that is verified to include them.
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```
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@ -3,23 +3,36 @@
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PROG=exclude_badExits.py
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SOCKS_PORT=9050
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SOCKS_HOST=127.0.0.1
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CAFILE=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
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# an example of running exclude_badExits with full debugging
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# expected to take an hour or so
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declare -a LARGS
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LARGS=(
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--log_level 10
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)
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# you may have a special python for installed packages
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EXE=`which python3.bash`
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LARGS+=(
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--strict_nodes 1
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--points_timeout 120
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--proxy-host 127.0.0.1
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--proxy-port $SOCKS_PORT
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$EXE exclude_badExits.py --help > exclude_badExits.txt &
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$EXE -c 'from exclude_badExits import __doc__; print(__doc__)' >exclude_badExits.md
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# an example of running exclude_badExits with full debugging
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# expected to 20 minutes or so
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declare -a LARGS
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LARGS=(
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# --saved_only
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# --strict_nodes 1
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--points_timeout 150
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--log_level 10
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--https_cafile $CAFILE
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)
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[ -z "$socks_proxy" ] || \
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LARGS+=(
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--proxy-host $SOCKS_HOST
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--proxy-port $SOCKS_PORT
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)
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if [ -f /var/lib/tor/.SelekTOR/3xx/cache/9050/notice.log ] ; then
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LARGS+=(--notice_log /var/lib/tor/.SelekTOR/3xx/cache/9050/notice.log)
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fi
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if [ -d /var/lib/tor/hs ] ; then
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LARGS+=( --hs_dir /var/lib/tor/hs )
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fi
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if [ -f '/run/tor/control' ] ; then
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LARGS+=(--proxy-ctl '/run/tor/control' )
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@ -34,8 +47,9 @@ LARGS+=( --white_onions $ddg )
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# you may need to be the tor user to read /run/tor/control
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grep -q ^debian-tor /etc/group && TORU=debian-tor || {
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grep -q ^tor /etc/group && TORU=tor
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}
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sudo -u $TORU $EXE exclude_badExits.py "${LARGS[@]}" \
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}
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# --saved_only
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sudo -u $TORU $EXE exclude_badExits.py "${LARGS[@]}" "$@" \
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2>&1|tee exclude_badExits6.log
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# The DEBUG statements contain the detail of why the relay was considered bad.
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|
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File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load diff
76
exclude_badExits.txt
Normal file
76
exclude_badExits.txt
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
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usage: exclude_badExits.py [-h] [--https_cafile HTTPS_CAFILE]
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[--proxy_host PROXY_HOST] [--proxy_port PROXY_PORT]
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[--proxy_ctl PROXY_CTL] [--torrc TORRC]
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[--timeout TIMEOUT] [--good_nodes GOOD_NODES]
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[--bad_nodes BAD_NODES] [--bad_on BAD_ON]
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[--bad_contacts BAD_CONTACTS] [--saved_only]
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[--strict_nodes {0,1}] [--wait_boot WAIT_BOOT]
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[--points_timeout POINTS_TIMEOUT]
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[--log_level LOG_LEVEL]
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[--bad_sections BAD_SECTIONS]
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[--white_onions WHITE_ONIONS]
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[--torrc_output TORRC_OUTPUT] [--hs_dir HS_DIR]
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[--notice_log NOTICE_LOG]
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[--relays_output RELAYS_OUTPUT]
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[--wellknown_output WELLKNOWN_OUTPUT]
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[--good_contacts GOOD_CONTACTS]
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optional arguments:
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-h, --help show this help message and exit
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--https_cafile HTTPS_CAFILE
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Certificate Authority file (in PEM)
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--proxy_host PROXY_HOST, --proxy-host PROXY_HOST
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proxy host
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--proxy_port PROXY_PORT, --proxy-port PROXY_PORT
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proxy control port
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--proxy_ctl PROXY_CTL, --proxy-ctl PROXY_CTL
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control socket - or port
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--torrc TORRC torrc to check for suggestions
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--timeout TIMEOUT proxy download connect timeout
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--good_nodes GOOD_NODES
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Yaml file of good info that should not be excluded
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--bad_nodes BAD_NODES
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Yaml file of bad nodes that should also be excluded
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--bad_on BAD_ON comma sep list of conditions - Empty,NoEmail,NotGood
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--bad_contacts BAD_CONTACTS
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Yaml file of bad contacts that bad FPs are using
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--saved_only Just use the info in the last *.yaml files without
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querying the Tor controller
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--strict_nodes {0,1} Set StrictNodes: 1 is less anonymous but more secure,
|
||||
although some onion sites may be unreachable
|
||||
--wait_boot WAIT_BOOT
|
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Seconds to wait for Tor to booststrap
|
||||
--points_timeout POINTS_TIMEOUT
|
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Timeout for getting introduction points - must be long
|
||||
>120sec. 0 means disabled looking for IPs
|
||||
--log_level LOG_LEVEL
|
||||
10=debug 20=info 30=warn 40=error
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--bad_sections BAD_SECTIONS
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sections of the badnodes.yaml to use, in addition to
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||||
BadExit, comma separated
|
||||
--white_onions WHITE_ONIONS
|
||||
comma sep. list of onions to whitelist their
|
||||
introduction points - BROKEN
|
||||
--torrc_output TORRC_OUTPUT
|
||||
Write the torrc configuration to a file
|
||||
--hs_dir HS_DIR Parse the files name hostname below this dir to find
|
||||
Hidden Services to whitelist
|
||||
--notice_log NOTICE_LOG
|
||||
Parse the notice log for relays and services
|
||||
--relays_output RELAYS_OUTPUT
|
||||
Write the download relays in json to a file
|
||||
--wellknown_output WELLKNOWN_OUTPUT
|
||||
Write the well-known files to a directory
|
||||
--good_contacts GOOD_CONTACTS
|
||||
Write the proof data of the included nodes to a YAML
|
||||
file
|
||||
|
||||
This extends nusenu's basic idea of using the stem library to dynamically
|
||||
exclude nodes that are likely to be bad by putting them on the ExcludeNodes or
|
||||
ExcludeExitNodes setting of a running Tor. *
|
||||
https://github.com/nusenu/noContactInfo_Exit_Excluder *
|
||||
https://github.com/TheSmashy/TorExitRelayExclude The basic idea is to exclude
|
||||
Exit nodes that do not have ContactInfo: *
|
||||
https://github.com/nusenu/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification That
|
||||
can be extended to relays that do not have an email in the contact, or to
|
||||
relays that do not have ContactInfo that is verified to include them.
|
||||
|
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@ -33,18 +33,39 @@ bHAVE_TORR = shutil.which('tor-resolve')
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# in the wild we'll keep a copy here so we can avoid restesting
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yKNOWN_NODNS = """
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---
|
||||
- a9.wtf
|
||||
- 0x0.is
|
||||
- a9.wtf
|
||||
- apt96.com
|
||||
- axims.net
|
||||
- backup.spekadyon.org
|
||||
- dfri.se
|
||||
- dotsrc.org
|
||||
- dtf.contact
|
||||
- ezyn.de
|
||||
- for-privacy.net
|
||||
- galtland.network
|
||||
- heraldonion.org
|
||||
- interfesse.net
|
||||
- kryptonit.org
|
||||
- linkspartei.org
|
||||
- mkg20001.io
|
||||
- nicdex.com
|
||||
- nx42.de
|
||||
- pineapple.cx
|
||||
- privacylayer.xyz
|
||||
- privacysvcs.net
|
||||
- prsv.ch
|
||||
- sebastian-elisa-pfeifer.eu
|
||||
- thingtohide.nl
|
||||
- tor-exit-2.aa78i2efsewr0neeknk.xyz
|
||||
- tor-exit-3.aa78i2efsewr0neeknk.xyz
|
||||
- tor-exit-2.aa78i2efsewr0neeknk.xyz
|
||||
- tor-exit-3.aa78i2efsewr0neeknk.xyz
|
||||
- tor.dlecan.com
|
||||
- tor.skankhunt42.pw
|
||||
- transliberation.today
|
||||
- tuxli.org
|
||||
- unzane.com
|
||||
- verification-for-nusenu.net
|
||||
- www.defcon.org
|
||||
"""
|
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# - 0x0.is
|
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# - aklad5.com
|
||||
|
|
@ -220,7 +241,8 @@ def lIntroductionPoints(controller=None, lOnions=[], itimeout=120, log_level=10)
|
|||
l += lp
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||||
except (Empty, Timeout,) as e: # noqa
|
||||
LOG.warn(f"Timed out getting introduction points for {elt}")
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||||
continue
|
||||
except stem.DescriptorUnavailable as e:
|
||||
LOG.error(e)
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
LOG.exception(e)
|
||||
return l
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue